Categories
FLSA Overtime/Wage & Hour

Answers to Your Questions about the New White Collar Regulations

Answers to Your Questions about the New White Collar RegulationsThe Department of Labor has so-called “rule making” authority regarding the white-collar exemptions to the FLSA overtime regulations. These include the professional, administrative, and executive exemptions. President Obama charged the DOL with issuing amendments to update these regulations. Most of the attention has centered on the expected revisions to the “salary basis” test.

Prior to the revisions, employees must earn a weekly salary of at least $455.00 per week to qualify for these exemptions. The Obama administration has argued that this threshold amount, which has remained unchanged for an extended period of time, is simply too low. The DOL issued a proposal, pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, which would raise this amount to slightly over $50,000 and index it for future increases.

The proposal elicited more than 270,000 comments. By way of comparison, the 2004 revisions elicited only 70,000 comments. In May, the Department of Labor finally published the revisions. Here, we will address some of the most frequently asked questions arising out of the new rules.

What is the new “salary basis?”

During the notice and comment period, the DOL was apparently poised to raise the salary basis from $23,660 per year to slightly more than $50,000.00. This would have represented 40% of the average salaried wage for exempt employees.[fusion_builder_container hundred_percent=”yes” overflow=”visible”][fusion_builder_row][fusion_builder_column type=”1_1″ background_position=”left top” background_color=”” border_size=”” border_color=”” border_style=”solid” spacing=”yes” background_image=”” background_repeat=”no-repeat” padding=”” margin_top=”0px” margin_bottom=”0px” class=”” id=”” animation_type=”” animation_speed=”0.3″ animation_direction=”left” hide_on_mobile=”no” center_content=”no” min_height=”none”][1] In April, however, word leaked that the new salary basis would be slightly lower. The new salary basis was ultimately set at $913.00 per week ($46,476 per year).

How did the DOL arrive at this salary basis?

It was the product of a compromise. The DOL ultimately set the salary basis at the 40th percentile of earning of full-time salaried workers in the lowest-wage “census region,” which is the South.

How will it be indexed?

The DOL recognized that the political climate makes it difficult to raise the salary basis as often as appropriate. Therefore, under the final rule, the threshold salary will automatically update every three years. Each update will adjust the minimum salary to the 40th percentile of earning of full-time salaried workers in the lowest-wage “census region.”

What about the Highly Compensated Employee Exemption?

Prior to the revisions, employees earning $100,000 and performing minimal exempt duties were exempt from overtime. The revisions raise this number to $134,004 per year. Like the salary basis test, this number will automatically adjust every three years. It is set at the 90th percentile of full time salaried workers nationally.

When will the next round of salary adjustments be made public?

The Department of Labor will post new salary levels 150 days in advance of their effective date, beginning August 1, 2019.

Will Non-Discretionary Bonuses Be Included in the Salary Threshold?

During the notice and comment period, the DOL asked for comments on this issue. Under the final rule, non-discretionary bonuses are allowed to be counted toward the salary threshold, with a limit of 10%. In other words, the final regulations may say that no more than 10% of the salary necessary to satisfy the salary basis test can be in the form of a non-discretionary bonus.

Will There Be Changes to the Duties Test?

This was the big question. It was clearly the elephant in the room whenever this topic is discussed. During notice and comment, the DOL asked for comments on whether some minimum percentage of time must be spent performing non-exempt duties in order for an employee to satisfy the exemption. This would make the FLSA somewhat analogous to California state law. In the end, however, the DOL did not change the duties test.

If you believe your employer has violated the FSLA’s overtime provisions, or if you have concerns regarding exemptions, we can help. The Gilbert Firm represents employees throughout Tennessee who have been wrongfully exempted from their overtime pay. To schedule a consultation with a skilled Tennessee FSLA attorney, please contact Michael Russell or Clint Scott, or contact one of our offices in Nashville, Chattanooga, Memphis, Jackson or Knoxville by filling out our contact form, or by calling 888.996.9731.

[1]                 In 2004, it was set at 20% of the average salary for exempt workers in the South.[/fusion_builder_column][/fusion_builder_row][/fusion_builder_container]

Categories
FLSA Overtime/Wage & Hour

Telecommuters Are Protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act

Telecommuters Are Protected by the Fair Labor Standards ActA quick online search of the classifieds shows hundreds of openings for telecommuting positions. The beauty of such a position, of course, is that you are not limited to Tennessee; you can apply for any of the thousands of jobs in countries across the globe, and work from the comfort of your own home.

One of the primary drawbacks, however, is that it can be difficult to keep track of just how many hours a telecommuter works. For example, let us say that your normal lunch hour in an office runs between 1:00pm and 2:00pm. When you work from home, you may continue a project through that hour while consuming your lunch. Because you worked during that time, however, your employer is required to pay you for that time. Failure to do so is a direct violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Common problems for telecommuters

Telecommuters face a number of challenges that traditional office workers may not, when it comes to fair pay. Some of those challenges include:

  • Poor ability to accurately track hours worked
  • Pay discrepancies if a telecommuter’s internet or phone lines go down
  • Determining compensable travel time for required in-office visits after the work day has begun
  • Determining overtime in cases where the work day is done, but the employee continues to answer emails long after business hours are through

If the payroll policy is unclear, or there are disputes regarding contractual language, telecommuters may find themselves receiving less pay than expected. In some cases, it may be an unfortunate misunderstanding on behalf of the client; in others, however, the employee may have a claim under the FLSA, as “The rule is also applicable to work performed away from the premises or the job site, or even at home. If the employer knows or has reason to believe that the work is being performed, he must count the time as hours worked.”

If Fortune Magazine is correct, about 33% of “major employers” in the U.S. allows for some amount of telecommuting. Without proper tools and protocols in place, these employers may end up bilking their employees out of thousands, perhaps millions, of dollars in pay each year. At the Gilbert Firm, we protect the rights of workers whose employers have denied them fair compensation, or violate other tenets of the FLSA. To work with an experienced Tennessee wage and hour attorney, please contact Michael Russell, Clint Scott, or one of our offices in Nashville, Chattanooga, Memphis or Jackson, to reserve a consultation time.

 

Categories
FLSA Overtime/Wage & Hour

RULE 68 OFFERS OF JUDGMENT: CAMPBELL-EWALD CO. V. GOMEZ, 577 U.S. (2016)

RULE 68 OFFERS OF JUDGMENT- CAMPBELL-EWALD CO. V. GOMEZ, 577 U.S. (2016)The most important wage and hour case from the Supreme Court this year was not a wage and hour case at all. Rather, it was a Rule 23 class action involving the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The TCPA regulates text messages that are sent for marketing purposes. In Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez, 577 U.S. ___ (2016), which was handed down on January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court addressed the impact of Rule 68 Offers of Judgment on a class action.

The Context of the Gomez Case

To understand the 2016 Gomez case, it is necessary to briefly revisit the Supreme Court’s 20__ opinion in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, , 569 U.S. ____, (2013). In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Thomas, the Court assumed without deciding that an unaccepted offer of judgment that fully satisfies a plaintiff’s claim is sufficient to render an individual’s claim moot. Based on that premise, the Court then went on to consider whether an FLSA collective action claim can move forward when the underlying individual claim has been rendered moot. The Court ruled that it could not.

For reasons that are not entirely clear, the litigants in the Genesis Heathcare case assumed for purposes of the appeal that an unaccepted Offer of Judgment mooted the plaintiff’s claim. The assumption, which the majority in Genesis Healthcare did not question, caused great frustration to Justice Kagan.

Justice Kagan’s entertaining dissenting opinion, which begins by announcing that the Court has resolved an “imaginary question” and encouraging the reader to “[fusion_builder_container hundred_percent=”yes” overflow=”visible”][fusion_builder_row][fusion_builder_column type=”1_1″ background_position=”left top” background_color=”” border_size=”” border_color=”” border_style=”solid” spacing=”yes” background_image=”” background_repeat=”no-repeat” padding=”” margin_top=”0px” margin_bottom=”0px” class=”” id=”” animation_type=”” animation_speed=”0.3″ animation_direction=”left” hide_on_mobile=”no” center_content=”no” min_height=”none”][f]eel free to relegate the majority’s decision to the furthest reaches of your mind” since “[t]he situation it addresses should never again arise.” Joined by three justices, Justice Kagan argues fundamental contract principles—that an offer without an acceptance is a legal nullity — in determining that Ms. Symczyk’s claim was not rendered moot, thus undermining the assumption on which the majority’s decision hangs. Indeed, Justice Kagan argues, an FLSA collective action can never be rendered moot by an offer of judgment. This is because acting as a representative for a class of similarly situated persons is a part of the plaintiff’s claim. This part of the claim is not settled by an offer of judgment on the plaintiff’s individual claim alone and thus survives an offer that does not address the collective action.

Therefore, the threshold question – whether an individual plaintiff’s claim can be mooted by an unaccepted Offer of Judgment – remained unanswered. This brings us the Gomez case.

The Facts and Procedural History of Gomez

In Gomez, the plaintiff sued over a United States Navy recruitment program that he alleged violated the TCPA. He filed a Rule 23 class action in the Central District of California. Prior to the deadline for filing a motion for class certification, the Defendant submitted a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment, apparently for the full value of Gomez’s individual claim. The Plaintiff did not respond, and the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, “[n]o Article III case or controversy remained . . . because its offer mooted Gomez’s individual claim by providing him with complete relief.”

Prior to Gomez, there was a split among the circuit regarding whether an unaccepted Offer of Judgment for the plaintiff’s full relief mooted the claim. The First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had held that an unaccepted Offer of Judgment did not moot a plaintiff’s claim. Bais Yaakov v. Act, Inc, 798 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2015); Hooks v. Landmark Industries, Inc., 797 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2015); Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015); Tanasi v. New Alliance Bank, 786 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 2015; Stein v. Buccaneers Limited Partnership, 772 F.3d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 2014); Diaz v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp., 732 F.3d 948, 954-55 (9th 2013). By contrast, the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits had held that an unaccepted Offer of Judgment did moot the plaintiff’s claims. Warren v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A., 676 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 2012); O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2009); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 340 (3d Cir. 2004).

The Court Holds that Individual Claims Are Not Moot

In Gomez, the majority essentially adopted Justice Kagan’s dissent in Genesis Healthcare. Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion, which was joined my Kagan, Kennedy, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Roberts wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment. In her majority opinion, Ginsburg wrote, “We hold today, in accord with Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that an unaccepted settlement offer has no force. Like other unaccepted contract offers, it creates no lasting right or obligation.” She expressly acknowledged the reasoning of Justice Kagan’s dissent, stating, “We now adopt Justice Kagan’s analysis, as has every Court of Appeals ruling on the issue post Genesis Healthcare.

The Court noted that “The sole built-in sanction: ‘If the [ultimate] judgment . . . is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.’” [1] The Court concluded, “an unaccepted offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff’s case, so the District Court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate Gomez’s complaint.”

There was an interesting little nugget at the end of Justice Ginsburg’s Rule 68 analysis. She wrote, “We need not, and do not, now decide whether the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.”

Stay tuned.

The Gilbert Firm provides comprehensive representation on behalf of Tennessee employees who have been harmed because of wage and hour violations. Please contact Michael Russell, Clint Scott or one of our offices in Nashville, Chattanooga, Memphis, Jackson or Knoxville by calling 888.996.9731 or filling out our contact form, and scheduling your consultation with an experienced Tennessee FSLA violations attorney today.

[1]           The FLSA defines “costs” and “attorneys’ fees” as separate elements. 29 U.S.C. §216(b)(“The Court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”). “Consequently, unlike attorneys’ fees in civil rights actions governed by Section 1988, which allow a reasonable attorneys’ fee as part of the costs, attorneys’ fees in an FLSA action are not automatically shifted by a Rule 68 offer.” Kearns, Kaufmann, and McClelland, The Fair Labor Standards Act, 16-239 (Bloomberg BNA, 3d ed. 2015)(emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).[/fusion_builder_column][/fusion_builder_row][/fusion_builder_container]

Categories
Discrimination FLSA Overtime/Wage & Hour

Same, but Not Equal, is Illegal: Why Women Should Not be Afraid to Fight for Their Rights under the Equal Pay Act

Same, but Not Equal, is Illegal: Why Women Should Not be Afraid to Fight for Their Rights under the Equal Pay ActThere was a really interesting article in Trial Magazine, which is published by the American Association for Justice, about the Equal Pay Act, and how we, as employee rights attorneys, can better protect our clients who face wage discrimination in the workplace. That got us thinking about the EPA, and how little people seem to know about it. There are a number of protections offered under that Act, so we wanted to outline them for our readers.

First, though, a quick look at the Act itself. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 says, in short, that if a man and a woman do the same job, requiring the same skills, effort and responsibilities, and they do that job under the same conditions, then both the man and the woman must be paid the same amount of money. Employers who use a merit system, or base wages and raises on seniority, do have a little wiggle room here, as do employers who have a different system for calculating production. Overall, though, the law requires people to be paid the same wage for the same work.

But it also offers you some other protections, too, outside of monetary compensation. For example, the EPA also ensures that female employees are offered the same “perks” as male employees. Those perks might include:

  • Health benefits
  • Life insurance coverage
  • Participation in a company savings plan (like a 401k)
  • Use of company accounts (when applicable)
  • Use of company amenities, like a gym or a dining room
  • Access to any discounts or benefits offered to employees
  • Stock options
  • Vacation time
  • Reimbursement for travel expenses and college classes (if offered)
  • Opportunities for bonuses, if applicable

So the “pay” in the Equal Pay Act is not limited to just your check; it encompasses a slew of things that make up your compensation for work.

The EPA also offers one other major protection – the right to pursue justice in a court of law. If your employer has violated the law, you have the right to seek additional compensation through a lawsuit. That right is so critical; after all, women around the world are denied equal pay for the work they do every day, and they have no legal recourse for it. In this country, though, you can actually do something about it. And because EPA suits don’t require you to prove that the discrimination was intentional, you start off with a stronger case for that discrimination.

If you believe that your employer is violating the Equal Pay Act, you have options available to you. At the Gilbert Firm, we fight discrimination in all of its forms, seeking justice for our clients. To make an appointment with an experienced Tennessee wage and hour attorney, you can contact our office, call us at 888.996.9731, or reach out to Jonathan Bobbitt, Michael Russell, or Justin Gilbert directly. We maintain offices in every part of Tennessee – Nashville, Chattanooga, Memphis, Jackson and Knoxville – for your convenience.

Categories
FLSA Overtime/Wage & Hour

Court Strikes Down Class Action Waivers

Court Strikes Down Class Action WaiversThere has been a lot of handwringing among employee rights advocates over class action waivers. These are documents that are put in front of employees at the time they begin their employment. Employees unknowingly waive their right to participate in any class action, frequently also waiving their right to go to court. In such cases, an employee has agreed to submit their cases to arbitration instead of a jury.

Employees frequently have no idea what the documents say. If they do, they really don’t have a choice. It’s either sign them or remain unemployed. Employee rights advocates have long argued that such agreements are unfair and should not be enforced. We received a new tool in our fight when the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit handed down Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp. on May 26, 2016.

The Seventh Circuit became the first Court of Appeals to hold that class action waivers are invalid. The Court ruled – correctly – that such agreements violate §§7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act. Under §7 of the NLRA, “employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. §157.

Likewise, §8 enforces §7 by deeming that it “shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer….to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in [fusion_builder_container hundred_percent=”yes” overflow=”visible”][fusion_builder_row][fusion_builder_column type=”1_1″ background_position=”left top” background_color=”” border_size=”” border_color=”” border_style=”solid” spacing=”yes” background_image=”” background_repeat=”no-repeat” padding=”” margin_top=”0px” margin_bottom=”0px” class=”” id=”” animation_type=”” animation_speed=”0.3″ animation_direction=”left” hide_on_mobile=”no” center_content=”no” min_height=”none”][§7]” Id. §158(a)(1).

The Seventh Circuit recognized that “a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer.” They further ruled that “collective or class legal proceedings fit well within the ordinary understanding of ‘concerted activities.’” In striking down the class action waiver, the Lewis court noted that “collective, representative, and class legal remedies allow employees to band together and thereby equalize bargaining power.” This is exactly the type of protection that, according to the court, §7 and §8 of the National Labor Relations Act contemplated.

The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that their opinion was at odds with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB. This creates a split among the circuits that is likely to eventually end up in the hands of the United States Supreme Court. How the issue is ultimately decided will hinge largely on who replaces the late Justice Scalia. In other words, the current presidential election is crucial. Until then, however, the Lewis decision gives a bit of momentum to employees who attempt to fight back draconian class action waivers.

The Gilbert Firm advocates on behalf of employees who have been denied their rights because of unfair labor practices. To schedule a consultation with a Tennessee FSLA violations attorney like Michael Russell or Clint Scott, please fill out our contact form, or call 888.996.9731. We maintain offices in Nashville, Chattanooga, Memphis, Jackson and Knoxville for your convenience.[/fusion_builder_column][/fusion_builder_row][/fusion_builder_container]

Categories
FLSA Overtime/Wage & Hour

Regulations for White Collar Exemptions Leave Us with Questions

Regulations for White Collar Exemptions Leave Us with QuestionsThe much-anticipated revisions to the implementing regulations related to the white collar exemptions should be released in the next 60 to 90 days. Note the emphasis on the “should be.” For those who have not been waiting with baited breath for these regulations, here is a little background.

The Department of Labor has so-called “rule making” authority regarding the white-collar exemptions to the FLSA overtime regulations. These include the professional, administrative, and executive exemptions. President Obama has charged the DOL with issuing amendments to update these regulations. Most of the attention has centered on the expected revisions to the “salary basis” test.

Currently, exempt employees must earn a weekly salary of at least $455.00 per week to qualify for these exemptions. The Obama administration has argued that this threshold amount, which has remained unchanged for an extended period of time, is simply too low. The DOL issued a proposal, pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, which would raise this amount to $50,440.00 and index it for future increases.

The proposal elicited more than 270,000 comments. By way of comparison, the 2004 revisions elicited only 70,000 comments. Solicitor of Labor Patricia Smith briefed wage and hour practitioners the recent ABA Federal Labor Standards Legislation Committee meeting in February, which I attended. Solicitor Smith seemed to suggest that the regulations would likely be issued in July, though she walked that back a bit at comments latter in the meeting.

When the regulations are issued, the one thing that we know with a reasonable degree of certainty is that the salary basis test will be amended to establish a new salary threshold of slightly more than $50,000 per year. A number of questions, however, remain outstanding.

The Gilbert Firm provides comprehensive representation on behalf of workers. To reserve a consultation with a Tennessee wage & hour attorney, please contact Michael Russell or Clint Scott, or contact the firm directly. We maintain offices in Nashville, Chattanooga, Memphis and Jackson for our clients’ convenience.

[1]                 In 2004, it was set at 20% of the average salary for exempt workers in the South.[/fusion_builder_column][/fusion_builder_row][/fusion_builder_container]

Categories
FLSA Overtime/Wage & Hour

Class Action Lawsuit Filed against Kroger Regarding Overtime Pay and Exemptions

Class Action Lawsuit Filed against Kroger Regarding Overtime Pay and ExemptionsThere are 121 Kroger stores in Tennessee. It is the largest supermarket chain in the country. You can purchase almost anything from them: food, jewelry, medications – you can even obtain a credit card. It employs thousands of people across the state and close to half a million across the nation. And now it is at the center of a class-action lawsuit that claims its overtime policies (or lack thereof) violate the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as well as the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act.

The suit stems from three former call center employees. The Dayton Business Journal reports that these workers’ sole job “was to ask job applicants three questions to screen them for possible employment and then arrange for them to interview at the store to which they applied.” Kroger claimed that these employees were exempt from overtime under the category of administrative exemptions. Their lawsuit claims this label was misapplied, and now all three are seeking compensation for the 5-10 extra hours per week that they worked during their respective time there.

What is an administrative exemption?

The U.S. Department of Labor has three main criteria for an administrative exemption:

  • “The employee must be compensated on a salary or fee basis (as defined in the regulations) at a rate not less than $455 per week;
  • The employee’s primary duty must be the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers; and
  • The employee’s primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.”

Under the law, an employee’s job title may not exempt him or her from overtime pay; it is the work that employee does which matters.

The crux of the argument seems to be that the employees claim they had “no discretion with respect to matters of significance,” whereas Kroger may claim that as these workers determined who would be granted interviews, they did indeed have some input into hiring practices. According to the law, in matters of discretion, “The term must be applied in the light of all the facts involved in the employee’s particular employment situation, and implies that the employee has authority to make an independent choice, free from immediate direction or supervision.” The company may argue that choosing whom to move forward in the application process and whom to deny is a matter of discretion as well, which ultimately is a matter of significance.

The lawsuit was filed in February of 2016, so it is still in its initial stages. Given the importance of Kroger here in Tennessee, you can be sure we will follow this case with interest. If you believe you have been unfairly denied overtime, the Tennessee wage and hour attorneys of the Gilbert Firm can help. To schedule a meeting with Michael Russell, Clint Scott or an FLSA violations lawyer at one of our offices, please contact us. We are proud to serve clients in Nashville, Chattanooga, Memphis, and Jackson, and throughout the state.

Categories
FLSA Overtime/Wage & Hour

Are You Really an Independent Contractor, or Are You a Victim of Theft?

Are You Really an Independent Contractor, or Are You a Victim of Theft?It is illegal to misclassify a worker as a contractor or an intern when he or she is actually an employee. Yet this practice runs rampant in industries throughout the country, and it costs an individual worker thousands of dollars each year in lost wages and outside expenses. (Think about the average cost of a doctor’s visit when you do not have health insurance – insurance you are not entitled to receive because you are not an employee – and the difficulties you have playing that cost when you are not entitled to overtime wages, either.)

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as per the U.S. Department of Labor, there are certain factors that may help a worker prove that he or she has been wrongfully classified as a contractor when he or she is, in fact, an employee. Those factors include:

  1. “The extent to which the work performed is an integral part of the employer’s business.
  2. Whether the worker’s managerial skills affect his or her opportunity for profit and loss.
  3. The relative investments in facilities and equipment by the worker and the employer.
  4. The worker’s skill and initiative.
  5. The permanency of the worker’s relationship with the employer
  6. The nature and degree of control by the employer.”

Some industries are more likely to misclassify than others

Many people, it seems, believe that misclassification exists only within the construction industry, as “contractor” is synonymous in many cases with “construction worker.” However, many businesses that rely on individual contractors or interns in order to operate are guilty of this practice. Some of the more common industries include:

  • Marketing and advertising
  • Show business: film, TV, music, etc.
  • Fashion houses and garment manufacturing
  • Home health care
  • Tech companies
  • Ride-sharing services
  • Janitorial and maintenance services

By claiming an employee as a contractor, the business in question will pay lower taxes, and will not need to contribute to workers’ compensation insurance in the event that person is injured. Hiring interns is a simple way for a business to avoid paying anything, claiming that instead of pay the intern will gain valuable insight into how an industry works.

Cases like these are not as simple as the business would believe, however, and misclassification of an employee can come with steep fines and penalties – not to mention retroactive pay for the wrongly classified worker.

The Gilbert Firm helps to protect Tennessee workers whose rights to fair wages have been infringed upon through misclassification. Please contact Michael Russell or Clint Scott to learn more about how a skilled Tennessee wage and hour attorney can help. You can reserve your appointment at one of our offices in Nashville, Chattanooga, Memphis, or Jackson.

Categories
FLSA Overtime/Wage & Hour

Michael’s Take on the Proposed Change to the FLSA Salary Basis Test

The Obama Administration has released its long awaited revisions to the salary basis test under the FLSA’s so-called white collar exemptions. These changes are long overdue. Before we get to the change, let’s review the current state of the law.

The FLSA requires employers to pay one and one-half an employee’s regular rate of pay for any hours they worked over forty during a work week. There are exceptions to this rule. The most prominent group of exceptions is the so-called white collar exemptions. If you are a professional, executive, or fall under the administrative exemption, then you may not be entitled to overtime.

To be sure, employers break the law all the time. In order to fall within the so called white collar exemptions, the employees must perform certain duties. Too many times, employers simply label employees as “salaried” when they don’t actually fall within the duties that permit them to be salaried.

However, before you even get to that issue, employers must pay a minimum salary to employees before they can avoid paying overtime. Currently, that minimum salary is $23,660 per year, or $455 per week. This is a rather draconian number. It is not indexed for inflation, and it has only been raised once since 1975. Therefore, an “executive” who makes the minimum salary under the FLSA and has a family of four would be below the poverty line.

The proposed new regulations bring employers (kicking and screaming) into the 21st Century. It raises the threshold from $23,660 per year to $50,440 per year. With the new regulations, an employer would not be permitted to classify an employee as exempt from overtime without paying them at least this minimum annual salary, which translates to $970 per week.

What will happen? My guess is that many employers will change most employees’ classification from salary to hourly. While these employees would not then get the benefit of the higher salary basis test, they would at least begin receiving one and one-half their regular rate of pay for overtime.

The problem with the old rules is highlighted by a case I had a couple years ago. My client was an employee who was a “store manager” of a convenience store. He was paid a salary. They did not pay him overtime. However, the company did go ahead and keep time records to show the number of hours he worked. As result of the long hours, it was undisputed that his effective hourly rate was around $4.00 per hour. This is simply unconscionable. The proposed new regulations are a step in the right direction. There is absolutely no reason that an employee should work fifty hours a week in America, be classified as an “executive” or “professional” employee, and have a family that lives below the poverty line.

Categories
FLSA Overtime/Wage & Hour

The Supreme Court Tackles Security Screenings: Integrity Staffing v. Busk

Well, the Supreme Court’s term is drawing to a close. Our next few blog posts will address major employment law issues the Court handed down this year. We’ll start with the Busk decision, which addressed whether the time an employee spends waiting in line for a security screening is compensable “work” under the FLSA. These posts are largely drawn form written material that was prepared by Caraline Rickard, an outstanding law clerk at our firm and a third year law student at Vanderbilt. Full credit goes to her.

In Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk, the Supreme Court was asked to answer a simple question: If an employee is asked to complete an activity for the employer’s benefit, at the employer’s request, and on the employee’s time, is that work compensable? The activity in question is a security check to ensure that employees do not take merchandise from their place of employment, and I would submit that the obvious answer to the question seems to be yes. As the practice of requiring employees to undergo security checks has become more and more common, a number of plaintiffs and lawyers have thought so, too, and companies ranging from Apple to CVS Health to J.C. Penny, have been hit with lawsuits demanding pay for the time employees must wait to undergo security checks. That is why it came as somewhat of a surprise when the Supreme Court rules in a 9-0 decision that this time was not compensable under FLSA. While a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor attempted to limit the reach of the decision, it could still have far-reaching consequences not only on security checks but also on a host of other pre- and post-work requirements.

The plaintiffs in Busk were a class of employees who were employed by the Integrity Staffing agency to work in a Nevada warehouse owned by Amazon.com. Their job was to retrieve products from shelves and package them for delivery. Employees were required to undergo a security screening before leaving each day. This screening required that employees remove items such as wallets, keys, and belts and pass through a metal detector, much like a security screening at an airport. Because employees had to wait in line for their turn to pass through the metal detector, this screening took approximately 25 minutes each day. Integrity Staffing did not compensate employees for this time. The employees argued that, because this screening was the sole benefit of the employer and because the screening took longer than necessary, they were entitled to compensation.   The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit found that because the post-shift screenings were necessary to the principle work the employees performed and done for the benefit of the employer, the time spent on the screenings was compensable under FLSA.

The Supreme Court, in an opinion again written by Justice Thomas, began by reviewing the history of FLSA. Shortly after the Act’s passage, courts began interpreting its terms broadly. In 1944, the Supreme Court defined work as used in FLSA as “physical or mental exertion . . . controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.” In 1946, workweek was similarly defined to include “all time during which an employee is necessarily required to be on the employer’s premises, on duty or at a prescribed workplace.” According to the Court’s calculations in Busk, these expansive definitions led to 1,500 lawsuits that sought nearly $6 billion in back pay and liquidated damages for various pre- and post-shift activities. Congress responded to this flood of litigation by passing the Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947, which specifically exempted from FLSA’s overtime requirements time spent “walking, riding, or traveling” to and from the workplace and time spent on “activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to . . . principal activity . . . .” The Supreme Court subsequently interpreted principal activity to “embrac[fusion_builder_container hundred_percent=”yes” overflow=”visible”][fusion_builder_row][fusion_builder_column type=”1_1″ background_position=”left top” background_color=”” border_size=”” border_color=”” border_style=”solid” spacing=”yes” background_image=”” background_repeat=”no-repeat” padding=”” margin_top=”0px” margin_bottom=”0px” class=”” id=”” animation_type=”” animation_speed=”0.3″ animation_direction=”left” hide_on_mobile=”no” center_content=”no” min_height=”none”][e] all activities which are an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities.” The Court in Busk announced that an activity meets this requirement when it is “an intrinsic element of the [principal activities the employer is employed to perform] and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is the perform his principal activities.”

Based on this definition of principal activity, the Court determined that because “Integrity Staffing does not employ its workers to undergo security screenings, but to retrieve products from warehouse shelves and package those products for shipment to Amazon customers,” the security screenings were not an “intrinsic and indispensable part of the principal activities” and thus were not compensable under FLSA. It rejected the Ninth Circuit’s test focusing on whether the employer required a particular activity and whether the activity was for the benefit of the employer because such a broad definition would “sweep into ‘principal activities’ the very activities the Portal-to-Portal Act was designed to address.” The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that they should be compensated for their waiting time because the screenings took longer than necessary, finding that “these arguments are properly presented to the employer at the bargaining table, . . . not to a court in an FLSA claim.”

In a concurrence joined by Justice Kagan, Justice Sotomayor claimed to completely agree with the Court’s decision, but she created some room for interpretation in two significant ways. First, Justice Sotomayor defined an activity as indispensable when “an employee could not dispense with it without impairing his ability to perform the principal activity safely and effectively.” The Court, on the other hand, defined an indispensable activity as “one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his principal activities”—no mention of safely or effectively. Second, Justice Sotomayor clarifies the Court’s principal activities analysis, stating that “[she] understand[s] the Court’s analysis to turn on its conclusion that undergoing security screenings was not itself work of consequence that the employees performed for their employer.” This interpretation seems to me to flirt with the Ninth Circuit’s test looking at whether the work was performed for the benefit of the employer.

To summarize, Busk is most important for its definition of work that is “integral and indispensable,” and therefore compensable, as an activity that is “an intrinsic element” of the activities a worker is employed to perform and “one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is perform” his job duties. Busk tells us the requiring warehouse employees to undergo screening checks before leaving does not fit this definition. But I do not think Busk is particularly useful in supplying us with an real way to predict what other activities might or might not meet the Court’s test. Immediately following its definition, the Court attempts to both reconcile its definition with its past decisions and offer some guidance by referencing three other situations: battery-plant employees showering and changing clothes, meatpackers sharpening their knives, and poultry-plant employees waiting to don protective gear. The first two activities, the Court decides, are protected, battery-plant employees because “the chemicals in the plant were toxic to human beings” and meatpackers because “dull knives would slow down production . . ., affect the appearance of the meat [and] the quality of the hides, cause waste, and lead to accidents.” On the other hand, the latter was noncompensable because “waiting to don protective gear . . . was two steps removed from the productive activity on the assembly line.”

But the Busk Court succinctly states its position as, “Integrity Staffing did not employ its workers to undergo security screenings . . . .” Surely, the battery factory did not employ their workers to take showers, nor did the meatpacking plant employ butchers to sharpen knives. And even in the case of the poultry plant workers, the court found that the time actually spent donning and doffing protective gear was covered; it was only the time spent waiting that was not. Yet in Busk, the Court finds that the entire security screening is noncompensable; in fact, the Court specifically states that its holding applies to “employees’ time spent waiting to undergo and undergoing Integrity Staffing’s security screens.”

Because the Court’s criteria for finding when an activity is “integral and indispensable” is thus quite ambiguous, courts and parties alike are likely to find Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence especially helpful. Her addition of the words “safely and effectively” to the definition of indispensable activity is the only logical basis on which the examples the Court presents can be reconciled: showering and sharpening knives were necessary for employees to complete their jobs safely and effectively; donning protective clothing does protect the safety of poultry plant workers, while waiting to do so does not; and security screenings do not improve either the safety or effectiveness of Amazon warehouse packers. Given the weight that is likely to be given to Justice Sotomayor’s “integral and indispensable” test, the question must be asked which principal activities analysis will win: the majority’s “productive work that the employee is employed to perform” test or Justice Sotomayor’s “work of consequence that the employees performed for their employer.” If Justice Sotomayor’s opinion is also given weight here, it could potentially reach more activities than the first, since an employee is specifically employed to perform a certain set of tasks but could perform “work of consequence . . . for the employer” outside the tasks she is actually employed for.

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